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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
but it seems clear that it disagrees with those states which regard the
nonviable fetus as a person or allow recovery for a stillborn fetus on
the basis that it existed as a person.
The decisions on wrongful death because of prenatal injuries have
eliminated either the requirement of live birth or viability but have
not allowed an action when both are absent. Since it was the medical
discovery that the child is never part of the mother that initiated the
dramatic reversal in allowing recovery for prenatal injuries, it seems
that the logical result is to allow recovery where the plaintiff can show
that the tortious injury was the proximate cause of the death regard-
less if the fetus was viable at the time of injury or the child lived for
a few moments after birth. Since medical science has established the
separate existence of the fetus at the time of conception the law should
protect the unborn child from a tortfeasor and allow the child to main-
tain an action without reference to its point of gestation or number
of movements outside of the womb. Once the tort has been committed
the only requirement for recovery should be in establishing a casual
connection between the tort and the injury. Proof of that element
should be determined by medical experts.
Kenneth L. Brune
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-§ 9-503-PEACEABLE REPOSSES-
SION BY SECURED PARTY WITHOUT NOTICE TO DEBTOR IS CON-
STITUTIONAL WHEN SECURITY AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY SO PRO-
VIDES. Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch.
1973).
In the recent case of Giglio v. Bank of Delaware,1 the constitu-
tionality of Delaware's Uniform Commercial Code § 9-5032 was chal-
lenged. The issue raised was whether the Uniform Commercial Code's
authorization of the taking of property without notice and without a
hearing constituted a denial of procedural due process. In holding
that DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 9-503 was merely a codification of
1. 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 1973).
2. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 5A, § 9-503 (1972).
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the common law right of self-help, the Delaware courts have reinforced
the majority opinion that U.C.C. § 9-503 is constitutional.
In this case, Giglio, the plaintiff, had entered into a conditional
sales contract with the Kent County Motor Company for the purchase
of an automobile. On the same day, Kent sold and assigned all its
right, title, and interest in the contract and the automobile to the de-
fendant, Bank of Delaware. At all times pertinent to the lawsuit the
Bank had a perfected security interest in the automobile.
Giglio paid the monthly installments of the contract for a few
months but then defaulted on a payment. At this time the Bank noti-
fied Giglio of his default. Subsequently, Giglio defaulted on the next
installment payment.
The Bank then repossessed the automobile without Giglio's
knowledge. This repossession was undertaken without giving Giglio
notice of any intention to repossess; however, no breach of the peace
was involved. The court said this repossession was somewhat sur-
reptitious.' Nevertheless, the court's opinion was that this repossession
by the Bank was not a deprivation of due process under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
There were three important stipulations made by Giglio. They
were: that he had breached the contract and was in default; that the
Bank had not breached the contract nor had it waived Giglio's breach;
and that there was no breach of warranty with respect to the sale of
the automobile.
The Delaware statute that controlled specifically in this case pro-
vides that "unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral . . . ." The statute fur-
ther provides that possession may be had without judicial notice if it
may be accomplished without a breach of the peace.5 Oklahoma has
enacted a statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-503, that is identical to
Delaware's.
3. Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816, 817 (Del. Ch. 1973), the court
termed the repossession surreptitious because it was done by using a duplicate key, at
7:15 a.m. from the area of Giglio's home.
4. DEL. CODE AN., tit. 5A, § 9-503 (1972).
5. Id.; the remainder of this statute reads:
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if
this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the
security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to
assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place
to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both
parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable,
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-504.
[Vol. 10
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The contract under scrutiny in this case not only did not provide
otherwise, as allowed by the statute, but, in fact, expressly authorized
the Bank "on default, to enter any premises without notice or demand
on the plaintiffs, and without breach of the peace, to retake posses-
sion of the vehicle." This is an extremely important fact as will be
seen later.
Giglio's argument consisted of two contentions. First, he asserted
that the repossession by the Bank without prior notice and without
first affording him the benefit of a judicial hearing constituted a tak-
ing of property without due process of law. Second, insofar as the
Delaware statute authorized such action, it was unconstitutional. Gig-
lio supported his assertions with recent Supreme Court cases which
held that certain takings of property or property interests without bene-
fit of prior notice and hearing constituted a denial of due process. 7
Giglio reasoned that these cases stood for "the proposition that
no property can be retaken by a conditional seller, even on admitted
default by the buyer, without first giving the defaulting buyer notice
of the intention to retake and the opportunity to first be heard on the
issue in an appropriate tribunal."" Further, though no state official
was involved, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 9-503 authorized this
action and thus it was accomplished through state action. To support
this second line of reasoning, Giglio cited the case of Adams v. Egley.
The Bank merely argued that this was an action between two
private parties pursuant to a specific agreement and thus no state ac-
tion nor denial of due process was involved.
The Giglio court began by discussing what constitutes state action
for the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. It held that state action
occurred "wherever there is state participation through any arrange-
ment, management, funds or property, and the fact that conduct is
'formally private' does not insulate it from the amendment if it is 'imra
6. Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816, 818 (Del. Ch. 1973).
7. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), (state cannot arbitrarily terminate
welfare benefits without a hearing); Sniadach v. Family Finance Co., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (must give hearing to debtor before garnishing his wages to satisfy his debt);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1972) (violation of due process to suspend driver's li-
cense without notice and hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Replevin
statutes authorizing state officials to recover property covered by conditional sales con-
tract prior to hearing stage were held unconstitutional).
8. Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816, 818 (Del. Ch. 1973).
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pregnated with a governmental character.' "10 This characterization of
state action could include private action done under authority of state
law.
The court next discussed the history of the right to peaceful re-
possession by a secured creditor. The English common law has held
for almost one hundred years that where it is provided in an agreement
between parties, a conditional seller might repossess the collateral upon
the buyer's default by means of retaking the property wherever it was
located. The seller could even use force, if necessary, as long as he
did not breach the peace. This was referred to as the right of self-
help and ironically was mentioned in a case cited by Giglio in support
of his claim.1
In Oklahoma the right of self-help has deep historical roots also.
The comment to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-503 reads: "Oklahoma has
previously allowed the secured party to take possession without judicial
process so long as it was done without breach of the peace."' 2  Re-
cently, the 1967 case of Kroeger v. Ogden'8 has upheld the right of
self-help. The Kroeger decision held that a mortgagee has a "right
practically amounting to a license" to take possession of the collateral
if the chattel mortgage contains a specific provision allowing him to do
so upon any default by the mortgagor. 4 The only restriction placed
upon the mortgagee's taking is that it must not involve any breach of
the peace. There are no restrictions concerning entry upon the mort-
gagor's private property or any requirements of notice. Thus the right
of self-help is still alive today.
In view of the continued recognition of self-help and the specific
contract rights given to the Bank in Giglio, the Delaware court rea-
soned that the Bank's use of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 9-503 did
not constitute state action. There was no creation of a new right in
the secured creditor which he would not have had but for the statute.
Rather, the statute in question was merely a codification of an old
10. Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816, 819 (Del. Ch. 1973).
11. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79 n.12 (1972). The court acknowledged in
a footnote that "the creditor could, of course, proceed without the use of state power,
through self-help, by 'distraining' the property before a judgment."
12. OKLA. STAT., tit. 12A, § 9-503 (1971). See Firebough v. Gunther, 106 Okla.
131, 233 P. 460 (1925). The comment was based upon an implied negative of the
Firebough decision, in which it was held that the repossession was not peaceable and
therefore was conversion. For what is deemed a breach of the peace see, Malone v.
Darr, 178 Okla, 443, 62 P.2d 1254 (1937).
13. 429 P.2d 781 (Okla. 1967).
14. Kroeger v. Ogden, 429 P.2d 781, 785 (Okla. 1967).
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common law. That law was summarized by the Giglio court as being
"[I]f the parties so provide in their agreement, a secured party may
privately retake his collateral upon default by private means and with-
out the necessity of judicial action, provided he can do so peace-
ably." The court then cited several cases which held a like opin-
ion.' 6 The challenge to the constitutionality of U.C.C. § 9-503 was
thus defeated by the Delaware court.
But was it really? The court's reasoning here is very circular
considering the language of U.C.C. § 9-503. The basis of the rea-
soning in Giglio rested upon the holding that U.C.C. § 9-503 merely
codifies the common law. Therefore, the reasoning continued, there
is no creation of a new right in the secured party and consequently
no state action prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
It is proposed that U.C.C. § 9-503 does not merely codify the
common law right of self-help. The right of self-help applies only
when there is a specific agreement in the contract between the parties
that the secured party may take possession of the property upon de-
fault by the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-503 provides that the secured party
may have this right to take possession "unless otherwise agreed ''l r be-
tween the parties. It is asserted that there is a great deal of difference
between these two rights and that U.C.C. § 9-503 creates a greater
right in the secured party than the right of self-help has previously
established.
It appears as if U.C.C. § 9-503 only codifies the common law
right of self-help when the contract involved specifically mentions the
secured party's repossession rights. But what if a contract makes no
mention of the secured party's rights to possession upon default? Does
U.C.C. § 9-503 then create a new right to take possession in the se-
cured party that he would not have had under the common law? If
so, and the secured party takes possession of the collateral pursuant to
the statute, does not such a taking constitute state action, even if done
peaceably? Arguably it does, since the taking was done under au-
15. Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816, 819 (Del. Ch. 1973).
16. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Greene v. First
Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America,
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'1 Bank, 332 F. Supp. 604
(S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402
(N.J. Super. 1972); Kipp v. Coyens, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1067 (Cal. Super. 1972); Brown
v. United States Nat'1 Bank, 509 P.2d 442 (Ore. 1973); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank,
351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972).
17. UNWoni COMMERClUL CODE § 9-503 (1972).
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thority of state law and not pursuant to any private agreement be-
tween the parties or common law right.
The Delaware court did not have to face this problem, nor is
this situation likely to arise. In business dealings of today, a contract
involving a security interest would rarely fail to include explicit provi-
sions detailing the rights of the secured party upon the debtor's de-
fault. Nonetheless, it may not be prudent to give blanket constitu-
tional approval to U.C.C. § 9-503.
David C. Cohernour
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